Правило 4. Приглашение женщины к половому акту

Опубликовано khantibalo от 13 февраля, 2020 - 16:44
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4. Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, speak in the presence of a woman in praise of ministering to his own sensuality thus: “This, sister, is the foremost ministration, that of ministering to a virtuous, fine-natured follower of the celibate life such as myself with this act”—alluding to sexual intercourse—it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community. ¶
“Now at that time a certain woman, a widow, was beautiful, attractive, and appealing.
So Ven. Udāyin, dressing (§) early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, went to her residence.
On arrival, he sat on an appointed seat.
Then the woman went to him and, having bowed down to him, sat to one side.
As she was sitting there, Ven. Udāyin instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged her with a talk on Dhamma.
Then the woman—instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with Ven. Udāyin’s talk on Dhamma—said to him, ‘Tell me, venerable sir, what I would be capable of giving you that you need: Robe-cloth?
Almsfood?
Lodgings?
Medicines for the sick? ’ ¶
“‘Those things aren’t hard for us to come by, sister….
Give just what is hard for us to come by. ’ ¶
“‘What, venerable sir? ’ ¶
“‘Sexual intercourse. ’ ¶
“‘Is it a need, venerable sir? ’ ¶
“‘A need, sister. ’ ¶
“‘Then come, venerable sir.
’ Entering into an inner room, taking off her cloak, she lay back on a bed.
Then Ven. Udāyin went to the woman and, on arrival, said, ‘Who would touch this vile, stinking thing?
’ And he departed, spitting. ¶
“So the woman criticized and complained and spread it about… ‘How can this monk Udāyin, when he himself begged me for sexual intercourse, say, “Who would touch this vile, stinking thing? ” and depart spitting?
What’s evil about me?
What’s stinking about me?
In what am I inferior to whom? ’” ¶
At first glance this rule might seem redundant with the preceding one, for what we have here is another case of a bhikkhu advising, begging, or imploring a woman to perform sexual intercourse.
The Sub-commentary, borrowing the Commentary’s classification of types of lust, states that the rules differ in terms of the lust involved.
According to it, only the desire to say something lewd would fall under the preceding rule; only the desire for sexual intercourse would fall here.
However, as we have seen, the Commentary’s neat system for classifying desires contradicts some important passages in the Vibhaṅga, and so the Sub-commentary’s explanation has no ground on which to stand. ¶
A more likely explanation for the need for this rule derives from some facts about language and belief in the Buddha’s time that might have led some people to feel that the behavior in the origin story here was a special case not covered by the preceding rule.
To prevent this sort of misunderstanding, it gets separate treatment under this rule. ¶
“Giving,” in the Buddha’s time, was a common euphemism for having sex.
If a woman “gave” to a man, that meant that she willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with him.
Now, Buddhism was not the only religion of the time to teach that gifts—of a more innocent sort—given to contemplatives produced great reward to those who gave them, and ultimately somebody somewhere came up with the idea that because sex was the highest gift, giving it to a contemplative would produce the highest reward.
Whether this idea was first formulated by faithful women or by clever contemplatives is hard to say.
Several cases in the Vinita-vatthu to Pr 1 tell of bhikkhus approached or attacked by women professing this belief, which shows that it had some currency: Sex was somehow seen as a way to higher benefits through the law of kamma. ¶
Because the preceding rule gives exemptions for bhikkhus speaking “aiming at (spiritual) welfare (attha), aiming at Dhamma,” some misguided souls who did not comprehend the Buddha’s teachings on sensuality might believe that welfare of this sort might fit under the exemption.
The origin story alludes to this point in a punning way, in that the word for “need” is also attha, and perhaps the widow, in using the word, had both its meanings in mind: Her spiritual welfare would be enhanced by meeting a bhikkhu’s needs.
Even today, although the rationale might be different, there are people who believe that having sex with spiritual teachers is beneficial for one’s spiritual well being.
Thus we have this separate rule to show that the Buddha would have no part in such a notion, and that a bhikkhu who tries to suggest that his listener would benefit from having sex with him is not exempt from an offense. ¶
The K/Commentary lists five factors for the full offense here, but only four of them have a basis in the Vibhaṅga: object, perception, intention, and effort. ¶
Object: ¶
A woman experienced enough to know what is properly or improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd. ¶
Perception ¶
The bhikkhu perceives her to be a woman. ¶
Intention ¶
He is impelled by lust.
According to the K/Commentary, this means he is lustful for his listener to minister to his desire for sexual intercourse.
However, the Vibhaṅga defines overcome with lust here in the same broad terms it uses under Sg 2 & 3. This suggests that the factor of intention here can be fulfilled simply by the desire to enjoy making such remarks in a woman’s presence—say, getting a charge out of testing her reaction, which appears to have been Ven. Udāyin’s impulse in the origin story—regardless of how one feels about actually having sex with her. ¶
Effort ¶
The bhikkhu speaks to the woman in praise of her ministering to his sensual needs, referring to sexual intercourse as a meritorious gift.
The Commentary maintains that his remarks must directly mention sexual intercourse for this factor to be fulfilled, but the examples in the rule itself and in the Vibhaṅga contradict its assertion.
Some of the examples in the Vibhaṅga state simply, “This is foremost.
This is best.
This is the utmost.
This is highest.
This is excellent.”
These statements are followed by the explanation that they have to allude to or be connected with sexual intercourse.
It does not say that the allusion has to be explicit. ¶
Also, the Vinita-vatthu contains a number of cases in which bhikkhus simply tell women to give the highest gift, sexual intercourse—and one in which a bhikkhu simply tells a woman that sexual intercourse is the highest gift—without explicitly saying to whom it should be given. The bhikkhus all earn saṅghādisesas for their efforts, which shows that the reference to oneself need not be explicit, either. ¶
Both the Commentary and the K/Commentary state that a physical gesture—this would include writing a letter—can fulfill the factor of effort here as well. ¶
The K/Commentary adds result as a fifth factor, saying that the woman must immediately understand one’s remark, but there is no basis for this in the Canon. ¶
Derived offenses ¶
The only factors with permutations leading to lesser offenses are object and perception. ¶
Object ¶
A bhikkhu, correctly perceiving his object and impelled by lust, makes such a remark to a paṇḍaka: a thullaccaya.
To a man or animal: a dukkaṭa (§).
(As under the preceding rule, the PTS edition of the Canon omits all of these cases, and the K/Commentary omits the man and the animal. The Burmese and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon put the relevant passages in ellipses; the Thai edition seems to be correct in mentioning all of these cases explicitly.) ¶
Perception ¶
A bhikkhu, impelled by lust, makes such a remark to a woman he perceives to be something else—a paṇḍaka, man, or animal: a thullaccaya.
To a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal he perceives to be something else: a dukkaṭa (§).
(Again, as under the preceding rule, the PTS edition omits most of the cases in this last sentence, including only the case of a bhikkhu speaking lustfully to a paṇḍaka he perceives to be a woman; the Thai edition seems more correct in including the remaining cases as well.) ¶
Counting offenses ¶
Offenses are counted by the number of people to whom one makes such a remark. ¶
Non-offenses ¶
The non-offense clauses in the Vibhaṅga, in addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under Pr 1, read simply: “There is no offense if he speaks saying, ‘Support us with the requisites of robe-cloth, almsfood, lodgings, or medicines for the sick.’”
The K/Commentary explains this as meaning that if one is motivated by a sensual desire for robe-cloth, etc., one may speak to a potential donor in praise of giving these things.
In other words, given this sort of desire, this sort of statement is allowable.
From this interpretation it can be argued that when a bhikkhu is speaking without any lust or sensual desire of any sort, he may make any of the remarks that would fulfill the factor of effort here in the presence of others without incurring an offense.
A prime example would be when, while explaining this rule, he quotes examples of the remarks it forbids. ¶
Summary: Telling a woman that having sexual intercourse with a bhikkhu would be beneficial is a saṅghādisesa offense. ¶
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