Гл. 17. Неведение обуславливает волевые конструкции

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Avijjāpaccayāsaṅkhārapadavitthārakathā ¶
616. Evamimesu catuvīsatiyā paccayesu ¶ 101. Now, as regards these twenty-four conditions: ¶
ayaṃ avijjā, Paccayo hoti puññānaṃ, duvidhānekadhā pana; ¶ For those of merit ignorance Is a condition in two ways ¶
Paresaṃ pacchimānaṃ sā, ekadhā paccayo matāti. ¶ And for the next in many ways But for the last kind only once. ¶
Tattha puññānaṃ duvidhāti ārammaṇapaccayena ca upanissayapaccayena cāti dvedhā paccayo hoti. 102. Herein, for those of merit ignorance is a condition in two ways: it is a condition in two ways, namely, as object condition and as decisive-support condition.
Sā hi avijjaṃ khayato vayato sammasanakāle kāmāvacarānaṃ puññābhisaṅkhārānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo hoti. For ignorance is a condition, as object condition, for formations of merit of the sense sphere at the time of comprehending [by means of insight] ignorance as liable to destruction and fall;
Abhiññācittena samohacittaṃ jānanakāle rūpāvacarānaṃ. and it is likewise for those of the fine-material sphere at the time of knowing a confused mind by means of direct-knowledge consciousness [through penetrating others’ minds, and so on].
Avijjāsamatikkamatthāya pana dānādīni ceva kāmāvacarapuññakiriyavatthūni pūrentassa, rūpāvacarajjhānāni ca uppādentassa dvinnampi tesaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo hoti. But it is a condition, as decisive- support condition, in two cases, that is to say, [for the sense-sphere formation] in one who, for the purpose of surmounting ignorance, fulfils the various instances of sense-sphere merit-making consisting in giving, etc., and [for the fine-material- sphere formation] in one who arouses the fine-material jhānas [for the same purpose].
Tathā avijjāsammūḷhattā kāmabhavarūpabhavasampattiyo patthetvā tāneva puññāni karontassa. ¶ Likewise in one who effects that merit while aspiring to the delight of sense-sphere becoming and fine-material becoming because he is confused by ignorance. ¶
Anekadhā pana paresanti apuññābhisaṅkhārānaṃ anekadhā paccayo hoti. 103. And for the next in many ways: it is a condition for formations of demerit in many ways.
Kathaṃ? How?
Esā hi avijjaṃ ārabbha rāgādīnaṃ uppajjanakāle ārammaṇapaccayena, garuṃkatvā assādanakāle ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayehi, avijjāsammūḷhassa anādīnavadassāvino pāṇātipātādīni karontassa upanissayapaccayena, dutiyajavanādīnaṃ anantarasamanantaraanantarūpanissayāsevananatthivigatapaccayehi, yaṃkiñci akusalaṃ karontassa hetu sahajāta aññamañña nissaya sampayutta atthi avigatapaccayehīti anekadhā paccayo hoti. ¶ As object condition at the time of the arising of greed, etc., contingent upon ignorance; as object-predominance and object-decisive-support respectively at the times of giving importance [to ignorance] and enjoying [it]; as decisive-support in one who, being confused by ignorance and unaware of danger, kills living things, etc.; as proximity, contiguity, proximity-decisive- support, repetition, absence, and disappearance, for the second impulsion and those that follow; as root-cause, conascence, mutuality, support, association, presence, and non-disappearance, in one doing anything unprofitable. It is thus a condition in many ways. ¶
Pacchimānaṃ sā ekadhā paccayo matāti āneñjābhisaṅkhārānaṃ upanissayapaccayeneva ekadhā paccayo matā. 104. But for the last kind only once: [542] it is reckoned as a condition in one way, namely, as decisive-support condition only, for formations of the imperturbable.
So panassā upanissayabhāvo puññābhisaṅkhāre vuttanayeneva veditabboti. ¶ But its relation as decisive-support condition should be understood as stated under formations of merit. ¶
617. Etthāha – kiṃ panāyamekāva avijjā saṅkhārānaṃ paccayo, udāhu aññepi paccayā santīti? 105.Here it may be asked: But how is this? Is ignorance the only condition for formations, or are there other conditions?
Kiṃ panettha, yadi tāva ekāva, ekakāraṇavādo āpajjati. What is the position here? For firstly, if it is the only one, there follows the assertion of a single cause;17 17.
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Athaññepi santi, "avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā"ti ekakāraṇaniddeso nupapajjatīti? but then if there are others, the description of it as a single cause, namely, “With ignorance as condition there are formations,” is incorrect—
Na nupapajjati. It is not incorrect.
Kasmā? Why not?
Yasmā – ¶ Here is the reason: ¶
Ekaṃ na ekato idha, nānekamanekatopi no ekaṃ; ¶ Nor from a single cause arise One fruit or many, nor one fruit from many; ¶
Phalamatthi atthi pana eka-hetuphaladīpane attho. ¶ ’Tis helpful, though, to utilize One cause and fruit as representative. ¶
Ekato hi kāraṇato na idha kiñci ekaṃ phalamatthi, na anekaṃ. 106. Here there is no single or multiple fruit of any kind from a single cause,
Nāpi anekehi kāraṇehi ekaṃ. nor a single fruit from multiple causes,
Anekehi pana kāraṇehi anekameva hoti. but only multiple fruit from multiple causes.
Tathā hi anekehi utupathavībījasalilasaṅkhātehi kāraṇehi anekameva rūpagandharasādikaṃ aṅkurasaṅkhātaṃ phalaṃ uppajjamānaṃ dissati. So from multiple causes, in other words, from temperature, earth, seed, and moisture, is seen to arise a multiple fruit, in other words, the shoot, which has visible form, odour, taste, and so on.
Yaṃ panetaṃ "avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇa"nti ekekahetuphaladīpanaṃ kataṃ, tattha attho atthi, payojanaṃ vijjati. ¶ But one representative cause and fruit given in this way, “With ignorance as condition there are formations; with formations as condition, consciousness,” have a meaning and a use. ¶
Bhagavā hi katthaci padhānattā, katthaci pākaṭattā, katthaci asādhāraṇattā desanāvilāsassa ca veneyyānañca anurūpato ekameva hetuṃ vā phalaṃ vā dīpeti. 107. For the Blessed One employs one representative cause and fruit when it is suitable for the sake of elegance in instruction and to suit the idiosyncrasies of those susceptible of being taught. And he does so in some instances because it is a basic factor, and in some instances because it is the most obvious, and in some instances because it is not common to all.
"Phassapaccayā vedanā"ti hi padhānattā ekameva hetuphalamāha. In the passage “With contact as condition, feeling” (M I 261) he mentions a single cause and fruit because they are basic factors.
Phasso hi vedanāya padhānahetu yathāphassaṃ vedanā vavatthānato. For contact is the basic cause of feeling since the kinds of feeling are defined according to the kinds of contact [as “eye-contact-born feeling” and so on],
Vedanā ca phassassa padhānaphalaṃ yathāvedanaṃ phassavavatthānato. and feeling is contact’s basic fruit since contact is defined according to the kinds of feeling [that it produces].
"Semhasamuṭṭhānā ābādhā"ti (a. ni. 10.60) pākaṭattā ekaṃ hetumāha. He mentions a single cause in the passage “Disease due to phlegm” (A V 110) because that is the most obvious.
Pākaṭo hi ettha semho, na kammādayo. For here what is obvious is the phlegm, not the kamma, etc., [mentioned later in the same sutta].
"Ye keci, bhikkhave, akusalā dhammā, sabbe te ayonisomanasikāramūlakā"ti asādhāraṇattā ekaṃ hetumāha. He mentions a single cause in the passage “Bhikkhus, any states whatever that are unprofitable are all rooted in unwise attention” (cf. S V 91) because it is not common to all.
Asādhāraṇo hi ayonisomanasikāro akusalānaṃ, sādhāraṇāni vatthārammaṇādīnīti. For unwise attention to unprofitable things is not common to all [states] in the way that, say, physical basis and object are common to all.
Tasmā ayamidha avijjā vijjamānesupi aññesu vatthārammaṇasahajātadhammādīsu saṅkhārakāraṇesu "assādānupassino taṇhā pavaḍḍhatī"ti (saṃ. ni. 2.52) ca "avijjāsamudayā āsavasamudayo"ti (ma. ni. 1.104) ca vacanato aññesampi taṇhādīnaṃ saṅkhārahetūnaṃ hetūti padhānattā, "avidvā, bhikkhave, avijjāgato puññābhisaṅkhārampi abhisaṅkharotī"ti pākaṭattā, asādhāraṇattā ca saṅkhārānaṃ hetubhāvena dīpitāti veditabbā. 108. Consequently, although other causes of formations such as physical basis and object, conascent states, etc., are actually existent, still ignorance may be understood as the representative cause of formations [firstly] because it is the basic factor as the cause of other causes of formations such as craving, etc., as it is said: “Craving increases in one who dwells seeing enjoyment” (S II 84), and “With the arising of ignorance there is the arising of cankers” (M I 55); and again because it is the most obvious, “Not knowing, bhikkhus, in ignorance, he forms the formation of merit” (cf. S II 82); and lastly because it is not common to all.
Eteneva ca ekekahetuphaladīpanaparihāravacanena sabbattha ekekahetuphaladīpane payojanaṃ veditabbanti. ¶ So the use of one representative cause and fruit should in each instance be understood according to this explanation of it. 18 ¶ Комм. НТ: 18.Parihāra-vacana—“explanation”: not in PED in this sense.
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618. Etthāha – evaṃ santepi ekantāniṭṭhaphalāya sāvajjāya avijjāya kathaṃ puññāneñjābhisaṅkhārapaccayattaṃ yujjati? 109. Here it may be said: “We admit that. But ignorance is reprehensible and has entirely undesirable fruit. How then can it rightly be a condition for formations of merit and of the imperturbable? Здесь можно сказать: "Хорошо, пусть так. Но неведение заслуживает осуждения и её плод целиком и полностью нежелателен. Как возможно, что оно может быть условием для волевых конструкций, проявляющихся в виде добродетельных поступков и волевых конструкций, приводящих к непоколебимому?
Na hi nimbabījato ucchu uppajjatīti. Sugarcane does not grow from [bitter] nimba seeds.” Ведь сахарный тростник не вырастает из семян горького растения нимба?".
Kathaṃ na yujjissati? Why should it not be right?
Lokasmiñhi – ¶ For in the world [that is, even among thinkers outside the Dispensation it is recognized that] ¶
Viruddho cāviruddho ca, sadisāsadiso tathā; ¶ Both as opposed and unopposed A state’s conditions may be found, ¶
Dhammānaṃ paccayo siddho, vipākā eva te ca na. ¶ And both as like and unlike too: That does not make it their result. ¶
Dhammānaṃ hi ṭhānasabhāvakiccādiviruddho cāviruddho ca paccayo loke siddho. 110. It is established in the world that when states have a condition, it may be opposed or unopposed to them as to presence, individual essence, function, and so on.
Purimacittaṃ hi aparacittassa ṭhānaviruddho paccayo, purimasippādisikkhā ca pacchā pavattamānānaṃ sippādikiriyānaṃ. For a preceding consciousness is a condition, opposed as to presence, for the succeeding consciousness; and the preceding training is a condition likewise for the plying of crafts, etc., which take place subsequently.
Kammaṃ rūpassa sabhāvaviruddho paccayo, khīrādīni ca dadhiādīnaṃ. Kamma is a condition, opposed as to individual essence, for materiality; and so are milk, etc., for curds, and so on.
Āloko cakkhuviññāṇassa kiccaviruddho, guḷādayo ca āsavādīnaṃ. Light is a condition, opposed as to function, for eye-consciousness; and so are molasses, etc., for intoxicants, and so on.
Cakkhurūpādayo pana cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ ṭhānāviruddhā paccayā. But eye-cum-visible-data, etc., are respectively a condition, unopposed as to presence, for eye-consciousness, and so on.
Purimajavanādayo pacchimajavanādīnaṃ sabhāvāviruddhā kiccāviruddhā ca. ¶ And the first impulsion, and those that follow, are a condition, unopposed as to individual essence and function, for the impulsions that follow them. ¶
Yathā ca viruddhāviruddhā paccayā siddhā, evaṃ sadisāsadisāpi. And just as conditions operate as opposed and unopposed, so also they operate as like and unlike.
Sadisameva hi utuāhārasaṅkhātaṃ rūpaṃ rūpassa paccayo, sālibījādīni ca sāliphalādīnaṃ. Materiality—for example, temperature and nutriment—is a condition for materiality: the like for the like. And so are paddy seeds, etc., for paddy crops, and so on.
Asadisampi rūpaṃ arūpassa, arūpañca rūpassa paccayo hoti, golomāviloma-visāṇa-dadhitilapiṭṭhādīni ca dubbā-sarabhūtiṇakādīnaṃ. The material is a condition for the immaterial, and so is the immaterial for the material: the unlike for the like. And so are ox hair and ram’s hair, horns, curd, and sesame flour, etc., respectively for dabba grass, reeds, bhūtanaka grass, and so on. 19 НТ: 19. Avi—“a goat or sheep”: not in PED. The Vism text reads “golomāvilomavisāṇa- dadhitilapiṭṭhādīni ca dubbāsarabhūtanakādīnaṃ.” Except for...
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Yesañca dhammānaṃ te viruddhāviruddhasadisāsadisapaccayā, na te dhammā tesaṃ dhammānaṃ vipākā eva. ¶ And those states for which these are the opposed and unopposed, like and unlike, conditions are not the results of these states as well. ¶
Iti ayaṃ avijjā vipākavasena ekantāniṭṭhaphalā, sabhāvavasena ca sāvajjāpi samānā sabbesampi etesaṃ puññābhisaṅkhārādīnaṃ yathānurūpaṃ ṭhānakiccasabhāvaviruddhāviruddhapaccayavasena, sadisāsadisapaccayavasena ca paccayo hotīti veditabbā. 111. So although this ignorance has entirely undesirable fruit for its result and is reprehensible in its individual essence, yet it should be understood as a condition, opposed or unopposed and like or unlike as the case may be, as to presence, function, and individual essence, for all these formations of merit, etc. Таким образом, хотя это неведение имеет полностью нежелательный плод в качестве последствия и по сути полностью заслуживает осуждения, его следует понимать как условие, противостоящее или непротивостоящее, схожее или отличающееся в каждом конкретном случае в части присутствия, функции и сущности для всех этих волевых конструкций, проявляющихся в виде добродетельных поступков и прочего.
So cassā paccayabhāvo "yassa hi dukkhādīsu avijjāsaṅkhātaṃ aññāṇaṃ appahīnaṃ hoti, so dukkhe tāva pubbantādīsu ca aññāṇena saṃsāradukkhaṃ sukhasaññāya gahetvā tassa hetubhūte tividhepi saṅkhāre ārabhatī"tiādinā nayena vutto eva. ¶ And its state as a condition has already been given in the way beginning, “For when unknowing—in other words, ignorance—of suffering, etc., is unaban- doned in a man, owing firstly to his unknowing about suffering and about the past, etc., then be believes the suffering of the round of rebirths to be pleasant and he embarks upon the three kinds of formations, which are the cause of that very suffering” (§62). ¶ И его состояние как условия уже давалось следующим образом: "Ведь когда незнание, называющееся неведением, страдания и прочего в человеке не устранено из-за его незнания о страдании и о прошлом и т.д., то он верит в том, что страдание в круге перерождения является приятным и он прибегает к трём видам волевых конструкций, являющихся причиной того самого страдания". ¶
619. Apica ayaṃ aññopi pariyāyo – ¶ 112. Moreover, there is this way of explanation as well: ¶ И также есть ещё один способ объяснения: ¶
Cutūpapāte saṃsāre, saṅkhārānañca lakkhaṇe; ¶ Now, when a man is ignorant Of death and rebirth and the round, ¶ Когда человек невежественен о смерти, перерождении и круге бытия ¶
Yo paṭiccasamuppanna-dhammesu ca vimuyhati. ¶ The characteristics of the formed, Dependently-arisen states, [544] ¶ Характеристиках конструированного, обусловленно возникших феноменах ¶
Abhisaṅkharoti so ete, saṅkhāre tividhe yato; ¶ And in his ignorance he forms Formations of this triple kind, ¶ И в своём неведении он конструирует три вида волевых конструкций ¶
Avijjā paccayo tesaṃ, tividhānampayaṃ tatoti. ¶ Then ignorance itself will be Condition for each of the three. ¶ Тогда неведение само будет условием для каждого из трёх. ¶
Kathaṃ pana yo etesu vimuyhati, so tividhepete saṅkhāre karotīti ce. 113. But how does a man who is confused about these things perform these three kinds of formations? Но как человек, заблуждающийся на эти темы творит эти три вида волевых конструкций?
Cutiyā tāva vimūḷho "sabbattha khandhānaṃ bhedo maraṇa"nti cutiṃ agaṇhanto "satto marati, sattassa dehantarasaṅkamana"ntiādīni vikappeti. ¶ Firstly, when he is confused about death, instead of taking death thus, “Death in every case is break-up of aggregates,” he figures that it is a [lasting] being that dies, that it is a [lasting] being’s transmigration to another incarnation, and so on. ¶ Заблуждаясь о смерти, вместо того чтобы считать смерть разрушением совокупностей во всех случаях, он представляет, что имеет место переселение вечной сущности в другое воплощение и т.п, ¶
Upapāte vimūḷho "sabbattha khandhānaṃ pātubhāvo jātī"ti upapātaṃ agaṇhanto "satto upapajjati, sattassa navasarīrapātubhāvo"tiādīni vikappeti. ¶ 114. When he is confused about reappearance, instead of taking rebirth thus, “Birth in every case is manifestation of aggregates,” he figures that it is a lasting being’s manifestation in a new body. ¶ Заблуждаясь о возрождении, вместо того, чтобы считать возрождение проявлением совокупностей во всех случаях, он представляет, что это проявление вечного существа (вечной сущности) в новом теле. ¶
Saṃsāre vimūḷho yo esa, ¶ 115. when he is confused about the round of rebirths, ¶ Тот кто заблуждается о круге бытия ¶
"Khandhānañca paṭipāṭi, dhātuāyatanāna ca; ¶ The endless chain of aggregates, Of elements, of bases too, ¶ "Бесконечная последовательность совокупностей, первоэлементов и сфер чувств ¶
Abbocchinnaṃ vattamānā, saṃsāroti pavuccatī"ti. – ¶ That carries on unbrokenly Is what is called “the round of births,” ¶ идущая непрерывно, зовётся кругом бытия" ¶
Evaṃ vaṇṇito saṃsāro, taṃ evaṃ agaṇhanto "ayaṃ satto asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ gacchati, parasmā lokā imaṃ lokaṃ āgacchatī"tiādīni vikappeti. ¶ instead of taking the round of rebirths as pictured thus, he figures that it is a lasting being that goes from this world to another world, that comes from another world to this world. ¶ - вместо понимания круга бытия как объяснено здесь, он представляет, что есть вечное существо, которое переходит из этого мира в другой мир и которое приходит из того мира в этот мир. ¶
Saṅkhārānaṃ lakkhaṇe vimūḷho saṅkhārānaṃ sabhāvalakkhaṇaṃ sāmaññalakkhaṇañca agaṇhanto saṅkhāre attato attaniyato dhuvato sukhato subhato vikappeti. ¶ 116. When he is confused about the characteristics of formations, instead of apprehending their specific and general characteristics, he figures that formations are self, belong to a self, are lasting, pleasant, beautiful. ¶ Заблуждаясь о характеристиках конструированного, вместо понимания их общих и конкретных характеристик он представляет, что конструированное является им самим, принадлежит ему самому, вечное, приятное и красивое. ¶
Paṭiccasamuppannadhammesu vimūḷho avijjādīhi saṅkhārādīnaṃ pavattiṃ agaṇhanto "attā jānāti vā na jānāti vā, so eva karoti ca kāreti ca. 117. When he is confused about dependently-arisen states, instead of taking the occurrence of formations to be due to ignorance, etc., he figures that it is a self that knows or does not know, that acts and causes action, Заблуждаясь об обусловленно возникших феноменах, вместо понимания, что волевые конструкции существуют благодаря неведению и т.д. он представляет "я знаю или не знаю, я поступаю и побуждаю к поступкам,
So paṭisandhiyaṃ upapajjati, tassa aṇuissarādayo kalalādibhāvena sarīraṃ saṇṭhapento indriyāni sampādenti. that appears in rebirth- linking, and he figures that atoms, an Overlord, etc., shape its body in the various states of the embryo and endow it with faculties, я проявляюсь при воссоединении ума", и он представляет как атомы, (или) властитель мира и (или) прочее формируют его тело в различных состояниях эмбриона и наделяют его способностями восприятия,
So indriyasampanno phusati, vediyati, taṇhīyati, upādiyati, ghaṭiyati. and that when it has been endowed with faculties it touches, feels, craves, clings, and endeavours, и когда он был таким образом наделён способностями восприятия, он соприкасается, испытывает, жаждет, присваивает и устремляется,
So puna bhavantare bhavatī"ti vā, "sabbe sattā niyatisaṅgatibhāvapariṇatā"ti (dī. ni. 1.168) vā vikappeti. ¶ and that it becomes anew in the next becoming; or he figures thus, “All beings … [are] moulded by fate, coincidence and nature” (D I 53). ¶ и он появляется снова в новом состоянии бытия. Или же он представляет себе так: "Все существа ... формируются судьбой, случаем и природой". ¶
So avijjāya andhīkato evaṃ vikappento yathā nāma andho pathaviyaṃ vicaranto maggampi amaggampi thalampi ninnampi samampi visamampi paṭipajjati, evaṃ puññampi apuññampi āneñjābhisaṅkhārampi abhisaṅkharotīti. ¶ 118. Thus he figures, blinded by ignorance. He is like a blind man who wanders about the earth, encountering now right and now wrong paths, now heights and now hollows, now even and now uneven ground, and so he forms formations now of merit, now of demerit, now imperturbable. ¶ Вот так он [всё] представляет, ослеплённый неведением. Он подобен слепому человеку, скитающемуся по земле, встречающий то правильные, то неправильные пути, то возвышенности то низины, то равнины, то неровную поверхность, и также он конструирует то волевые конструкции, проявляющиеся в виде добродетельных поступков, то волевые конструкции, проявляющиеся в виде дурных поступков то волевые конструкции, проявляющиеся в виде непоколебимого. ¶
Tenetaṃ vuccati – ¶ 119. Hence this is said: ¶
"Yathāpi nāma jaccandho, naro apariṇāyako; ¶ As one born blind, who gropes along Without assistance from a guide, ¶
Ekadā yāti maggena, ummaggenāpi ekadā. ¶ Chooses a road that may be right At one time, at another wrong, ¶
"Saṃsāre saṃsaraṃ bālo, tathā apariṇāyako; ¶ So while the foolish man pursues The round of births without a guide, ¶
Karoti ekadā puññaṃ, apuññamapi ekadā. ¶ Now to do merit he may choose And now demerit in such plight. ¶
"Yadā ca ñatvā so dhammaṃ, saccāni abhisamessati; ¶ But when the Dhamma he comes to know And penetrates the truths besides, ¶
Tadā avijjūpasamā, upasanto carissatī"ti. ¶ Then ignorance is put to flight At last, and he in peace may go. ¶
Ayaṃ "avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā"ti padasmiṃ vitthārakathā. This is the detailed explanation of the clause, “With ignorance as condition there are formations.
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